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SYMPOSIUM ON FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX 
OPINIONS 
THE CRITICAL TAX PROJECT, FEMINIST THEORY, AND 
REWRITING JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
Anthony C. Infanti and Bridget J. Crawford* 
In most social settings, disclosing that one is a tax professor usually 
stops conversation—and not in a good way. People tend to smile politely; 
they might inquire about a recent change to the tax law, complain that “tax 
day” is approaching, or ask for some free tax advice. Then the conversation 
topic tends to switch relatively quickly. This is true whether having a drink 
with fellow members of a community organization or attending a conference 
reception with other law professors. Most people think tax is boring (“Just 
tell me what I owe, and I’ll pay”), difficult to understand (“I don’t know how 
other people end up paying nothing in taxes”), or both. And even on those 
special occasions when one has the opportunity to socialize with other tax 
academics or economists, mention work in “critical tax theory” or “feminist 
analysis” and eyes tend to glaze over and the conversation may shift quickly 
to “safer” territory. Conversely, revelation to a group of feminist legal 
scholars that one studies tax likely will be met with a polite murmur, “Oh, 
how interesting,” or a kind head nod, before someone mentions a recent 
Supreme Court decision about gender discrimination. 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Anthony Infanti is the Christopher C. Walthour, Sr. Professor of Law at the University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law. Bridget Crawford is the James D. Hopkins Professor of Law at the Elisabeth 
Haub School of Law at Pace University. Together, they are the co-editors of CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION (2009) and FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS (2017). Although the 
principal faculty advisor to the Pittsburgh Tax Review, Professor Infanti played no role in the solicitation 
of or decision to accept for publication any of the essays that follow. 
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But the everyday relevance of taxation to all members of society 
combined with the persistence of pervasive discrimination along many 
different lines of disadvantage in U.S. society renders interrogation of tax 
law from a critical perspective vitally important. In fact, the importance of 
taxation and critical feminist perspectives on taxation are at the core of 
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions, which is the first volume in 
the series of books inspired by Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of 
the United States Supreme Court.1 The book of rewritten Supreme Court 
opinions, published in 2016, featured twenty-five “shadow judgments” and 
related commentary written by a diverse group of contributors that included 
law professors from every part of the academy as well as practitioners. The 
book’s editors sought to show how U.S. Supreme Court decisions might 
change if the justices used feminist perspectives, ideas, and methods when 
deciding cases.2 Using the same facts and law in existence at the time of the 
original decision, the feminist judgment rewriter was free to choose to write 
a dissent, concurrence, or an entirely new opinion. Each commentator was 
tasked with explaining the background and decision in the original case, how 
the shadow judgment differed from the actual opinion, and what difference 
the feminist opinion might have made if it had been the actual decision in the 
case.3 
Because of our own interest in studying tax law’s practical impact on 
historically disempowered groups and individuals,4 we believed that tax 
decisions were ripe for feminist rewriting as well. Linda Berger and Kathy 
Stanchi were enthusiastic about including a tax-oriented volume in the series 
of subject-matter specific books that had been approved by Cambridge 
University Press. We immediately began assembling a “wish list” of cases 
for a volume of Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions. 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Kathryn 
M. Stanchi et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: SCOTUS]; FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: 
REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS (Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti eds., 2017). 
2 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: SCOTUS, supra note 1, at 3. 
3 Id. at 8. 
4 See, e.g., Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford, Introduction to CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION xxi, xxii (Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2009). 
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Despite the popularity of the Supreme Court project,5 and the existence 
of several similar rewriting projects around the world,6 some of our tax 
colleagues expressed skepticism that the fundamental assumption underlying 
the Feminist Judgments project—that perspective matters—was applicable 
to an area like tax that is largely statutory. Indeed, there has been some 
scholarship devoted to gender and statutory interpretation,7 but it is an 
understudied area of the law. Yet, there is no shortage of work on how 
different methods and philosophies of statutory interpretation may impact a 
judge’s understanding of a particular law. In light of that robust area of 
scholarship, we thought there was great value in an anecdotal investigation 
into whether an explicitly feminist perspective—however a particular author 
defined that term—might impact the outcome or reasoning in tax cases. 
The thirteen shadow judgments and the related commentaries in 
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions bear out our instinct about the 
transformative impact of feminist judging, even in a statutory-based area of 
law. A judge that adopts a feminist perspective may reach different results 
than a judge who does not, or reach the same results using different 
reasoning, even when presented with the same facts, statutes, and case law. 
                                                                                                                           
 
5 See, e.g., Leslie A. Gordon, New Project Rewrites SCOTUS Opinions from a Feminist 
Perspective, ABA J. (Feb. 1, 2015, 3:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/new_ 
project_rewrites_scotus_opinions_from_a_feminist_perspective; Samantha Michaels, See How Your Life 
Would Change if We Cloned Ruth Bader Ginsburg, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www 
.motherjones.com/media/2015/10/feminist-judgements-supreme-court-ginsburg-roe-v-wade. 
6 See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: RIGHTING AND REWRITING LAW (Heather Douglas 
et al. eds., 2014); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (Rosemary Hunter et al. eds., 
2010); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS OF AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND TE RINO: A TWO-STRANDED ROPE 
(Elisabeth McDonald et al. eds., 2017); NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: JUDGES’ TROUBLES AND 
THE GENDERED POLITICS OF IDENTITY (Máiréad Enright et al. eds., 2017); Diana Majury, Introducing the 
Women’s Court of Canada, 18 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 1 (2006); Feminist International Judgments Project: 
Women’s Voices in International Law, U. LEICESTER, http://www2.le.ac.uk/institution/researchimages/ 
feminist-international-judgments-project-women2019s-voices-in-international-law (last visited May 8, 
2019); see also SCOTTISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT, http://www.sfjp.law.ed.ac.uk/; THE FEMINIST 
JUDGMENT PROJECT INDIA, https://fjpindia.wixsite.com/fjpi/call-for-papers; The African Feminist 
Judgment Project, CARDIFF L. & GLOBAL JUST., https://www.lawandglobaljustice.com/the-african-
feminist-judgments-project (last visited May 8, 2019); E-mail from Alma Luz Kadue Beltran y Puga 
Murai to Kathryn Stanchi (July 7, 2017) (on file with Kathryn Stanchi) (regarding Mexican Feminist 
Judgments). 
7 See, e.g., Gwen Thayer Handelman, Sisters in Law: Gender and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 
3 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39 (1993); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Legislator Named Sue: Re-Imagining the 
Income Tax, 5 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 289 (2002). 
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We were absolutely delighted when we heard from so many colleagues that 
the book inspired them to think or teach differently. The essays that follow 
represent the reactions of eleven different individuals—including recent law 
school graduates, practicing attorneys, long-time teachers of U.S. tax law, 
and colleagues who study tax, but primarily systems other than that of the 
United States. 
The series begins with a reflection by Canadian tax scholar Kim Brooks 
on the feminist statutory interpretation project generally, and the particular 
contours it takes in the tax context.8 As the editors of the Feminist Judgments 
volume of Supreme Court decisions had earlier done with respect to the 
contributions to that book, Brooks remarks upon the tax opinion rewriters’ 
emphasis on the lived experience of the parties in the cases and the use of 
narrative to convey personal stories to the court.9 Like their Supreme Court 
rewriting counterparts, the contributors to Feminist Judgments: Rewritten 
Tax Opinions tend to take a wider view of what constitutes “legal authority” 
than judges typically do.10 Brooks also draws attention to the feminist 
statutory embrace of substantive equality over formal equality in two of the 
opinions in the book.11 
Three of the contributions—from Diane Klein, Ann Mumford, and Ajay 
Mehrotra—respond directly to individual rewritten opinions included in the 
book. Klein’s essay highlights that what Alice Abreu affectionately refers to 
as “money law” is not just about economics.12 Because class, gender, and 
race are related, tax laws that benefit married couples tend to 
disproportionately benefit white couples (and, we would add, different-sex 
couples as well).13 Klein points out that Patricia Cain’s partial dissent in the 
                                                                                                                           
 
8 See Kim Brooks, Feminist Statutory Interpretation, 16 PITT. TAX REV. 125 (2019). 
9 Id. at 127, 129–30. 
10 Id. at 130. 
11 Id. at 131. 
12 Alice G. Abreu, Tax Counts: Bringing Money-Law to LatCrit, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 575, 575 n.1 
(2001) (“By ‘money-law,’ I mean the areas traditionally viewed as comprising the business curriculum: 
tax, corporations, securities, commercial law (UCC), securities, banking, antitrust and the like.”). 
13 Diane Klein, United States v. Davis and Prof. Cain’s Rewritten Opinion: An Intersectional 
Argument for Capping Section 1041, 16 PITT. TAX REV. 135 (2019). On the differential taxation of same-
sex couples, see, for example, Lily Kahng, The Not-So-Merry Wives of Windsor: The Taxation of Women 
in Same-Sex Marriages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 325 (2016). 
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rewritten United States v. Davis focuses on the disparate treatment of spouses 
in community property states in comparison with spouses in common law 
states.14 This inspires Klein to propose changes to § 1041 that would limit 
the amount of tax-free transfers of appreciated property incident to divorce. 
A capped benefit, like the limitation on the exclusion of gain on the sale of a 
principal residence under § 121, would presumably increase the amount of 
income taxes that wealthy divorced spouses would need to pay. As a 
statistical matter, most divorcing people do not have appreciated assets and 
so the Davis decision, both the original and as rewritten by Cain, would have 
a limited impact that would primarily affect more privileged couples, 
according to Klein.15 
In responding to David Cruz’s rewritten majority opinion in 
O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner, Ann Mumford notes Cruz’s technical 
expertise and his extraordinary attention to the taxpayer as “a party to the 
social contract at the heart of which sits tax.”16 Mumford’s essay, in its 
appreciation of Cruz’s careful language choice, invites the reader to consider 
the role that each of the Internal Revenue Service, the taxpayer, and the judge 
plays in tax litigation. She also holds out Cruz’s rewritten opinion as 
demonstrating the ability of a judge to act in a traditionally neutral role while 
still showing great respect for the taxpayer as a human being. This emphasis 
on the individual is a common method adopted by many of the contributors 
to Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions. Cruz’s subtle language 
seems to inspire Mumford with hope that judicial opinions might in fact be 
able to express full regard for a taxpayer’s humanity, and not simply for their 
consumption of, or contribution to, market rights. 
Ajay Mehrotra, himself a legal historian, expresses great admiration for 
the careful historical (and literary) analysis engaged in by Mary Louise 
Fellows in her rewrite of the Supreme Court’s decision in Welch v. Helvering, 
involving the deduction of certain purportedly business expenses.17 Fellows 
                                                                                                                           
 
14 Klein, supra note 13, at 136–37. 
15 Id. at 143–44. 
16 Ann Mumford, “Rhiannon O’Donnabhain Is a Taxpayer”: Tax and the Social Contract in 
O’Donnabhain v Commissioner, 16 PITT. TAX REV. 145 (2019). 
17 Ajay K. Mehrotra, “Life in All Its Fullness”: Cardozo, Fellows, and the Critical Context of 
Welch v. Helvering, 16 PITT. TAX REV. 151 (2019). 
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provides important context and detail that are missing from the original 
opinion. She refers to Mary Shelley’s book Frankenstein to show that 
economic relations are not always neatly divided between the private and 
public spheres, as Justice Cardozo conceived of them in the original opinion. 
Mehrotra urges Fellows—and presumably future Feminist Judgments 
writers—to be bold in their actions and to consider the ability that courts have 
to lead the way in effectuating social and legal change. He is critical of 
Fellows’s decision to remand the case for further consideration, deeming that 
a failure to take “a radical feminist stand on the case.”18 But it may be that 
Fellows was attempting to write an opinion that the real Supreme Court 
justices at the time would have joined, using her dicta, sources, and analysis 
to do the most work. 
In contrast to Klein, Mumford, and Mehrotra, who all write in response 
to particular judgments in the book, Hilary Escajeda takes inspiration from 
the project as a whole. Just as many of the contributions to Feminist 
Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions explore the false dichotomy between the 
“public” and “private” spheres, Escajeda proposes a change to the tax system 
that would accord symbolic and actual value to the unpaid care and service 
work that taxpayers do for families and communities.19 She proposes a 
refundable tax credit with inflation-adjusted caps and income phaseouts. As 
a practicing attorney, Escajeda recognizes that even a seemingly “minor” 
refundable credit can make a big difference in the lives of many taxpayers 
and their families. 
This series of review essays is greatly enriched by the comparative 
perspective of Åsa Gunnarsson (from Sweden) and Ann O’Connell and 
Kerrie Sadiq (from Australia, writing jointly). Gunnarsson, one of the most 
prominent international voices on gender and tax matters, seems to find hope 
in her own pessimism.20 On the one hand, she is discouraged by the rampant 
gender bias that the rewritten cases lay bare in Feminist Judgments: 
Rewritten Tax Opinions. She sees rewriting cases as too modest, too 
                                                                                                                           
 
18 Id. at 158. 
19 Hilary G. Escajeda, Called to Serve: Elevating Human-Performed Caregiver and Volunteer 
Work in an Era of AI-Robotic Technologies, 16 PITT. TAX REV. 161 (2019). 
20 Åsa Gunnarsson, Strategies to Materialize Gender Equality in Tax Law and Doctrine: Rewritten 
Tax Opinions, 16 PITT. TAX REV. 173 (2019). 
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incremental almost, to effectuate any kind of meaningful change in gender 
relations, particularly in North America (as compared to the experience in 
Scandinavia).21 On the other hand, Gunnarsson ultimately embraces legal 
reform as part of a larger social justice project. She uses recent developments 
in Swedish politics as a reminder that “there is no obvious end-point” to the 
feminist work of reform and, rather than dismiss endeavors such as the 
judicial rewriting projects that are taking place around the globe, states that 
feminists should “intensify our work to develop the body of feminist legal 
scholarship.”22 
O’Connell and Sadiq take as their inspiration Kathy Lahey’s chapter in 
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions discussing the Symes case from 
Canada. O’Connell and Sadiq canvas decisions from the United States, 
United Kingdom, and Australia on the deductibility of childcare expenses 
incurred to engage in paid employment outside the home.23 In all of these 
cases, the taxpayer lost and legislatures later stepped in to provide some 
relief—but always in ways that mark childcare costs as not being a legitimate 
business expense. Inspired by the real-life feminist judgment in Symes, 
O’Connell and Sadiq suggest that the time has come to reconsider this 
treatment and to allow a deduction for the cost of childcare. 
Alice Abreu and Montano Cabezas and Brandon King (the latter two 
writing together) round out the contributions by embracing their own situated 
perspectives. Abreu is an experienced tax teacher and scholar, yet she reveals 
that Fellows’s feminist rewrite of Welch v. Helvering caused her to rethink 
the way she had been teaching the case for more than thirty years.24 Abreu’s 
epistemic humility comes through clearly in her writing. Because she thinks 
so deeply about tax pedagogy, it is easy to see why Abreu has received 
numerous teaching awards. Abreu suggests that tax teachers should be aware 
of the value in referring to the taxpayers by their full names when teaching 
cases such as Gregory v. Helvering, Eisner v. Macomber, and Crane v. 
                                                                                                                           
 
21 Id. at 175. 
22 Id. at 177. 
23 Ann O’Connell & Kerrie Sadiq, Tax: Women, Work and Family, 16 PITT. TAX REV. 179 (2019). 
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Commissioner.25 Each of these cases involved a sophisticated female 
taxpayer. Abreu believes that when students understand that the litigants are 
female, the cases “can serve as a vehicle for delivering a message of 
empowerment for women, while also countering gender stereotypes.”26 She 
also invites teachers to do the same when discussing tax decisions by female 
judges and cases litigated by female attorneys.27 After all, one of Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s first sex discrimination cases was a tax case. Tax law becomes a 
vehicle for discussing social justice in Abreu’s vibrant classroom. 
Cabezas and King highlight how the feminist judgments—and indeed 
critical tax scholarship generally—allow a shift in focus from the technical 
operations of particular legal rules to the larger role that tax law plays in 
shaping society.28 They describe the disconnect that tax students can feel 
between their inclinations to work on questions like “equitable distribution 
and fairness across demographics” and real-life tax practice that is too often 
driven in ways that cater to, and preserve, wealth and privilege.29 Cabezas 
and King write with the same humility that Abreu does, acknowledging their 
own experiences of advantage, disadvantage, privilege, and pressure. They 
write with humanity—their own, their fellow students’, their tax colleagues’, 
and their tax teachers’—at the center of analysis. Cabezas and King 
emphasize that all good critical tax scholarship invites consideration of 
structural barriers to inequality and of how systems perpetuate bias. Critical 
tax work, they explain, “is not about attacking large corporations and wealthy 
individuals because of their worth, but instead about calling attention to how 
they amassed their wealth and encouraging those in power to recognize this 
truth.”30 Cabezas and King encourage empathy for the real individuals (and 
their struggles) behind cases in law school textbooks. 
The responsive essays in this volume reflect some of the responses that 
readers may have to the application of feminist legal methods and theories to 
tax decisions. Although we, too, can feel impatient with incremental change, 
                                                                                                                           
 
25 Id. at 194. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 195. 
28 Montano Cabezas & Brandon King, Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions—The Student 
Perspective, 16 PITT. TAX REV. 201 (2019). 
29 Id. at 203. 
30 Id. at 206–07. 
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these responses to the book also inspire hope that the rewriting project 
represents more than just wishful thinking. Rather, the book shows that actual 
cases involving real people could have been decided differently, if only the 
decision-makers had looked at the matters through altered lenses. The book’s 
opinions and commentaries collectively push back against the argument that 
statutes—with some allegedly fixed meaning—have an impermeability that 
common law cases do not. Those who interpret and apply statutes bring to 
that endeavor their cumulative life experiences and individual perspectives. 
Indeed, it is not possible to have a judge who lacks a unique perspective; each 
of us has one. To the extent that the judge has a viewpoint informed by 
feminism, we believe that the tax law has greater capacity to serve human 
needs. 
